Pornographic Art by Kieran, M.
Pornographic Art
Kieran, Matthew, 1968-
Philosophy and Literature, Volume 25, Number 1, April 2001,
pp. 31-45 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/phl.2001.0012
For additional information about this article
                                                        Access Provided by Open University at 07/05/11  1:52PM GMT
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/phl/summary/v025/25.1kieran.html
31Matthew Kieran
Philosophy and Literature, © 2001, 25: 31–45
Matthew Kieran
PORNOGRAPHIC ART
Pornographic art” is an oxymoron. At best, pornographic repre-sentations can only be bad art and, at worst, they cannot be art at
all. This is the received view.1 But what underwrites such aesthetic
contempt? There are three distinct lines of thought typically held to
warrant the apparent truism. Purely deﬁnitional considerations are
often cited as showing that pornography, as a matter of principle,
cannot be artistically valuable. The purpose of sexual arousal is some-
times adduced as rendering the production of pornographic represen-
tations artistically indifferent. It is also suggested, albeit far less often,
that though we may appreciate a work both as art and as pornography,
we cannot do so at one and the same time, i.e. we cannot appreciate a
work as pornographic art. I will show that not only is the received view
without warrant but, moreover, there are works which are valuable as
pornographic art.
I
The dismissal of pornographic art by deﬁnitional ﬁat runs as follows.
Pornographic representations are characterized as having the sole aim
of eliciting sexual arousal. By contrast, although erotic representations
might have this aim, they can also have other aims, including artistic
ones. Hence, an erotic representation can qualify as art in virtue of its
possession of, and possible realization of, artistic intent, but a porno-
graphic representation can never be art, or be valuable as such, since by
deﬁnition such a representation does not possess artistic intent.2
But what reason do we have to grant this characterization? Pornogra-
phy essentially involves the explicit representation of sexual behavior
“
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and attributes. Naturally this is insufﬁcient to constitute pornography
since anatomical drawings or medical textbooks may be sexually
explicit without being pornographic. Pornography as such seeks, via
the explicit representation of sexual behavior and attributes, to elicit
sexual arousal or desire. How does the pornographic stand in relation
to the erotic? The erotic clearly need not involve sexual explicitness.
Corregio’s Io, Degas’s portraits of ballet dancers, Robert Mapplethorpe’s
ﬂower studies, for example, are devoid of sexual explicitness and yet
they successfully solicit sensuous thoughts, feelings and associations
which are or may be arousing. The erotic essentially aims at eliciting
sexual thoughts, feelings, and associations found to be arousing. Thus
there are many things which are erotic but not pornographic—such as
a representation of someone suggestively eating strawberries—but
things which are pornographic are also erotic. Pornography is a
subspecies of the erotic or erotica—it seeks to realize the aim internal
to all that is erotic, but via the distinctive means of sexually explicit
representation, which many other erotic representations do not utilize.
Of course a work whose primary aim, as an erotic representation, is
sexual arousal may also have other aims, including artistic ones. An
artist may intend to produce a work which is sexually arousing and,
moreover, intend to do so in such a way that the artistry deployed
conveys a certain view, cognitive-affective state, or attitude regarding
what is depicted or the nature of the arousal elicited. This statement is
no different in principle from the recognition that Eisenstein can
intend and successfully produce a work that aims both to be propa-
ganda and artistically valuable. Indeed a work produced solely in order
to be sexually arousing, without any artistic intention, may yet artfully
suggest an insight, view or attitude towards what is represented.
Similarly, we recognize that someone may intentionally produce a
religious icon with the sole intent of evoking religious devotion, and yet
produce at the same time an icon of artistic worth.
Now, in terms of deﬁnitional characterization alone, we have no
reason to suppose that, as a matter of principle, what is possible with
respect to the erotic generally is precluded with respect to a particular
subcategory of the erotic—namely the pornographic. What we require
is a reason which explains why the pornographic may be inimical to the
realization of artistic value. The possibility of pornographic art cannot
be ruled out by deﬁnitional ﬁat.
Carving out the difference between the pornographic and other
forms of the erotic in terms of sole and multiple intent may gain some
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of its force from the kinds of representations adduced as paradigmatic.
There are many representations we would consider to be both
paradigmatically erotic and of high artistic value—for example, certain
works by Klimt, Degas, Gill, Rodin, Canova, Tintoretto, Goya, Ingres,
some of Shakespeare’s sonnets, Ovid’s The Art of Seduction, Scheherezade’s
Tales of 1001 Arabian Nights, or Buñuel’s Belle de Jour, to name but a few.
By contrast, if we think of paradigmatic pornographic representations,
from late Victorian ﬂick books to magazines such as Hustler, there seems
to be no artistic intent or merit of any kind.
Yet, as with many apparently natural contrasts, this approach cannot
do the work in sustaining the deﬁnitional distinction. It is obviously
true that most pornographic representations possess no artistic intent
or merit. But the same is true with respect to most representational
forms generally. Most pictures in card shops, most novels in run-of-the-
mill bookshops and many soap operas and ﬁlms similarly possess little
by way of artistic intent or merit. We do not take this as evidence that
visual depiction, novels or ﬁlms cannot possess artistic intent or merit.
Indeed, in particular genres the ratio seems exceedingly high—photo-
graphic portraiture, romance, fantasy, or science ﬁction novels, for
example, all seem predominated by formulaic, ﬂat, and artistically
uninteresting works. But this does not preclude some such instances
from possessing artistic intent or of being of high value as art.
Moreover, in certain genres, such as pulp ﬁction, much of the early
work possessed little artistic intent or merit and only as the genre
evolved did the ﬁrst novels and ﬁlms of artistic interest start to emerge.3
Even were one to grant that there are no pornographic works of
artistic interest as yet, it remains an open matter as to whether this is
due to the nature and limitations inherent in pornography, or if this is
a contingent fact due to certain historical and sociocultural factors. It
could be that, since pornography has been held to be deeply immoral,
obscene and subject to stringent censorship, those who possess artistic
talent are yet to exercise it in relation to pornographic subject matter.
We would not really expect spivs looking to make money illicitly from
pornography to concern themselves with artistic considerations. This
might explain why pornography has not evolved in a manner amenable
to artistic considerations, whereas other genres which emerged from
the unpromising beginnings of pulp ﬁction, such as Westerns, adven-
ture stories, and detective thrillers, have. Furthermore, it is far from
obvious that there are no artistically valuable pornographic representa-
tions. In literature, Nicholson Baker’s Vox, Georges Bataille’s Story of the
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Eye, the Kama Sutra, and, in visual art, some of the later work of Picasso,
the Egon Schiele portraits, the work of Hokusai and Utamaro, or
certain Kama Sutra illustrations, to name but a few, all seem to conform
to the characterization of pornography and yet apparently possess both
artistic intent and no little merit. Indeed, the sexual candor of much
ancient Greek, Greco-Roman, Roman, and medieval Indian art may
suggest that the paucity of art works in Christian inﬂuenced civilization
which are sexually explicit and which solicit arousal is an anomaly
rather than the norm. Now it could be that we are mistaken in thinking
such works really are pornographic or possess much by way of artistic
intent or merit. But the onus is on someone who would claim that our
pre-reﬂective judgments here are in error.
II
The deﬁnitional move does not stand up to scrutiny. The primary
purpose of a representation as pornography does not preclude it from
possessing other aims—including artistic ones. But a related thought,
which I shall term the problem of purposiveness, is often cited as
showing that pornography is inimical to the realization of artistic value.
In essence, the sexual explicitness, and the inherently formulaic and
fantastical nature of pornography, in the service of arousal, are taken to
preclude artistic expressivity and signiﬁcance.4
The claim has some initial plausibility. The more explicit the detail
about the nature, size, and state of physiological arousal of the sexual
organs, the greater the emphasis on showing the mechanics of sex, and
the more our attention is drawn to signs of sexual attraction and desire,
the more leaden, ﬂat, tedious and uninteresting a representation seems
to become. For the greater the explicit concentration on the physi-
ological, biological, and more generally animalistic aspects of sexual
behavior, the fewer the expressive possibilities apparently are. Hence, it
is thought, sexual explicitness in the service of arousal cannot convey
the states of mind, responses, and attitudes of characters, the nature of
their actions (as distinct from behavior) or, thus, any perspective of
interest the implied author may have upon what is represented.
On this view, a pornographic representation will have formulaic
markers for certain states, characters, and situations but these are
merely signaled in a minimal short hand manner rather than drawn out
in any complex and interesting way—in order to make room for as
much sexual explicitness as possible. So one is told that sexual
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antagonism exists, that a character is in a state of desire, suffering or
ecstasy, without one’s being imaginatively engaged in any way. Hence
pornography naturally converges on the most caricatured, simplistic,
one-dimensional representations of characters, situations, and states of
affairs. Thus pornography drives out the possibility of artistic expres-
sion. Furthermore, for this very reason, pornography is fantastical.
When we talk about great art we not only focus on the unity, complexity,
or intensity of its expressive aspects but, moreover, the ways in which
what is expressed may be insightful or true to life. Yet pornography can
bear no signiﬁcant relation to reality. For the characters are mere
ciphers, stereotypical substitutes, precluding any need on our part to
imagine in any depth their feelings, beliefs, and attitudes. Similarly, the
plots, such as they are in narrative pornography, remain ludicrous
caricatures of implausible situations, presented as if they were ordinary,
everyday occurrences. Thus, it is claimed, the artistic expressivity and
content of pornographic works will naturally yield poor results when
subjected to the kind of evaluations appropriate to a work as art.
But why should we grant that sexual explicitness in the service of
arousal cannot be expressive? Explicitness as such cannot be the
problem. Lucian Freud’s often highly explicit portraits of his nude
subjects are highly expressive—the way the mottled ﬂesh tones, con-
trasting textures of different parts of the body and differing propor-
tions are conveyed prescribes a fascination with and understanding of
what it is to apprehend another just as a body. Presumably the thought
is that Freud as an artist has a choice as to whether or not to be explicit.
Only if there is a horizon of possible choices available to a maker can
his choice of what to represent and the level of detail at which he
chooses to represent it become signiﬁcant. And in the case of pornog-
raphy, there is no such choice. But, although in pornography there is
no choice about whether or not to be sexually explicit in the service of
arousal, it does not follow that there are no choices available which may
be expressively signiﬁcant. Choices remain concerning how explicit the
representation might be and explicit with respect to what. More
signiﬁcantly there are multifarious choices concerning how the explicit-
ness may be treated and conveyed. A host of possibilities remain, such
as which act is being represented, the angle of portrayal, the perspec-
tive used, which if any character’s viewpoint is privileged, the kind of
lighting evoked, what responses are portrayed, how the bodily move-
ments are represented (for example, whether they are aggressive or
serene) what the facial expressions are, what parts are in or out of focus
36 Philosophy and Literature
or what coloration is used. In principle, these possibilities could all be
put to expressive use in an artistically interesting and signiﬁcant
manner. Different choices with respect to these features—even if
features of the very same act—may prescribe very different ways in
which we are to imagine and understand what is being represented and
how one is supposed to ﬁnd it arousing. Hence sexual explicitness even
in the service of arousal does not in principle preclude expressivity.
Consider an analogy. For a representation to constitute an icon the
image must be a depiction, in the service of religious devotion, of a
saint or personage as holy. Thus the representational content is strictly
circumscribed. But which saint, how detailed the portrayal, and how
the saint may be treated and conveyed leaves a wealth of choices open
to the maker which can be put to expressive use. Many religious icons
that serve the primary purpose of cultivating religious devotion are not
of much artistic interest or value. Nonetheless some are, and this is
precisely because, even within the limits of content imposed by the
primary purpose and means of portrayal, there are choices to be made
which can be used in an artistic and expressive manner. Similarly the
content of pornography is tightly circumscribed—it must be sexually
explicit and represent what it is explicit about as arousing. But, in
principle at least, how and in what way this may be done affords a host
of possibilities which could be put to expressive use. That pornography,
as such, must be explicit with respect to sexual acts does not, as yet,
afford any reason to suppose that pornography cannot, as a matter of
principle, be artistically valuable.
Still, the problem of purposiveness suggested that what renders the
sexual explicitness and representational content of pornography artisti-
cally mute is its inherently formulaic nature. The same kind of stock
roles, sexual acts, and one-dimensional narratives crop up in porno-
graphic representations time after time. This is no coincidence but a
function of the primary goal of pornography—the elicitation of sexual
arousal. For all features of the representation, from the crude sexual
explicitness to the one-dimensional stock roles of characters, the
hackneyed development of plot and trite narrative structure, are mere
instruments in the service of the pornographic goal.
It should be conceded that the formulaic nature of most pornogra-
phy is artistically indifferent. But it cannot be the formulaicness, as
such, of pornography which determines its aesthetic impoverishment.
First, most but not all pornographic representations are formulaic in
the way described. Consider the sexual writings of Anaïs Nin. Much
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narrative pornography conforms to formulaic elements: the descrip-
tions proffered are schematic, the characters sketched are caricatured
types, and the chronology of sexual activity is of little interest. In the
writing of Nin, by contrast, there is a strong emphasis on sensuous
evocation, the particularity and peculiarity of speciﬁc characters, a train
of events which has a certain emotional interest. Nin’s sexual explicit-
ness is represented in the service of arousal but, contrary to the formu-
laic nature of most pornography, it is simultaneously done in the service
of highlighting her active consciousness and desires, her differing
responses to certain sensations, particular people, and distinct situations.
Second, even where a pornographic representation is formulaic this
does not preclude it from realizing additional aspects of expressivity or
originality. Consider, for example, many of Rodin’s pornographic nude
drawings, such as Naked Woman Reclining with Legs Apart, Hands on Her
Sex or Naked Woman with Legs Apart, his many drawings of lesbians and
female nudes masturbating, and his drawings that accompanied Octave
Mirabeau’s pornographic novel Le Jardin des supplices. They are formu-
laic in virtue of explicitly representing female models singly or other-
wise in various standard sexual poses and acts. But they are delineated
via Rodin’s newly developing method of “instantaneous drawing.”
Unlike standard academic drawing of the time Rodin started from
mere contour heightened by wash, drawing from the model’s unstable
pose without taking his eyes off her, resulting in many correction lines,
heightening the sense of movement or animation. An additional effect
of such incisive contour drawing, through foregrounding mass and
volume with minimal shading, is to convey a sense of the subject’s
individuality rather than conformity to classical type. The manner of
representation Rodin developed in his line drawing was far from
formulaic and served not only to convey but to solicit sexual arousal
from the viewer as one attends to these features. The explicit focus on
the models’ genitals, sexual acts, and sensuous stimulation is enhanced
by Rodin’s emphasis on the sense of movement and rotation of the
body. In such drawings we have an emphasis on compositional and
design elements, some of which are a striking deviation from classical
nude studies, in order to evoke sexual stimulation by sexually explicit
means—evoking sensuousness, fascination, and arousal. The important
point here is that the speciﬁcally artistically innovative developments in
Rodin’s line drawing enabled him to characterize the lines of action,
sexual embraces, and actions in a more athletic, impulsive, vigorous
manner which enhances the evocation of sexual arousal. It is perhaps
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no surprise that Rodin’s sexual drawings were in great demand when
compared to the formal, static and, by comparison, somewhat languid
sexual fare that preceded him.
Lastly, generally speaking, being formulaic as such need not be an
artistically bad-making feature. Consider Westerns. To qualify as a
Western, for example, a narrative must conform to at least some of a
cluster of standard features—set in eighteenth- to nineteenth-century
North America, foreground the threat of violence from external lawless
groups or individuals, identify a solitary hero, and so on. But such
formulae need not be artistically impoverishing and may be an artistic
boon if used imaginatively. John Ford’s The Searchers, for example, has
nearly all the formulaic features of a standard Western, including a
confrontational contrast between the homesteading defenseless com-
munity of families and a lawless external world. Yet, in how this contrast
is conveyed—for example via shots of the family, eyes shaded against
the sun, waiting on the porch for a glimpse of the rider returning from
war—Ford elicits a sense of human sentiment doggedly living on in
hope against a hostile world. The compositional beauty of the land-
scape shots, small ﬁgures framed against epic landscapes, the outline of
a rider against the horizon, are used to enhance our sense of small men
struggling against a harsh, indifferent and threatening country. Such
conventional elements are used imaginatively in order to convey and
deepen our sense of a theme central to many Westerns—the impor-
tance and fragility of human affection faced with a harsh, violent,
blood-soaked world. In this light, consider some of the prints from the
Japanese Ukiyo-e school by artists such as Hokusai and Utamaro
depicting, among other scenes, prostitutes, bath-house girls, couples,
and even women with animals in varying degrees of sexual explicitness.
Hokusai’s Awabi Fisherwoman and Octopus, 1820–1830, is incredibly
explicit in its sexual detail, conveying both the ferociousness and
submission of self in sexual arousal. The prone woman, head back in
utter sexual absorption, is wrapped by the octopus tending to every
oriﬁce and area which heightens sexual arousal. The subjects of the
Ukiyo-e school, their expressive pictorial structures, and use of ﬂat
decorative color in the compositions are formulaic. Nonetheless, the
formulaic elements are artistically deployed in a manner that serves not
only to convey but to solicit sexual arousal from the viewer as one
attends to these features.
Yet the challenge from purposiveness remains. For, while it may be
granted that neither sexual explicitness nor formulaicness, as such,
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preclude artistic expressivity, at the same time it may be claimed that
the formulaic elements speciﬁc to pornography are fantastical and thus
preclude the realization of artistic value. The thin characterization, use
of stereotypical roles and situations, instrumental plotting, explicit
concentration on sexual acts and body parts are signiﬁcant only in so
far as they promote sexual arousal. In order to achieve this the
formulaic elements serve as one-dimensional backdrops sufﬁcient to
engage sexual interest but thin enough to allow for viewer projection
with regard to their sexual malleability and pliancy. Thus pornography’s
conventional elements are immune to constraints of plausibility, truth
to life, or insight.5
But this really won’t do. First, the formulaic elements, fantastical
though they may be in order to elicit sexual arousal, needn’t be
artistically indifferent if used imaginatively. Second, their fantastical
nature need not preclude a pornographic representation from being
“true to life.” Third, being “true to life” is only one criterion among
many of artistic evaluation, and it is often wholly inappropriate.
Consider Gustav Klimt’s erotic drawings. The female subjects are
represented in poses where they are revealing, prostrating, offering or
caressing themselves before the viewer. The sole concern is with the
women subsumed in sexual arousal and enjoyment in such a way as to
solicit arousal from the viewer. The scenes represented are formulaic—
absorbed female masturbation, passionately or languidly embracing
females, and the like. There is no context, background, or allusion to
any further meaning or signiﬁcance, just the isolated outlines of the
ﬁgures with little by way of detailed modeling of their bodies. The
subjects’ passivity, provocativeness, or autonomy are represented solely
in terms of sexuality—self-absorbed in the sexual act, eyes averted or
appealing to the viewers gaze and so on. The sole focus of interest is on
the sexual aspect of the female body, its sensual, aroused and arousing
nature. But although the formulaic elements of pornography are
manifest, in so far as sexual explicitness and the fantastical representa-
tion of women are used in the service of sexual arousal, nonetheless the
works are artistic. Formal artistic techniques are deployed in a highly
imaginative manner in order to emphasize explicitly sexual parts,
features, actions, and states—including the use of extreme close-up
views, foreshortening, exaggerated perspective, distortions of posture
and proportion, shifts in framing, heightened contrasts between right
angles and curves of the body. The effect not only is beautiful in terms
of the grace of line drawing and structural composition, but serves to
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draw attention to sexual features such as the genitals, breasts, buttocks,
and open legs. Furthermore these formal artistic techniques are used to
emphasize our awareness of the states of sexual absorption, sensual
pleasure, or languid sexuality represented.
Of course the Klimt nude studies are inherently fantastical in so far as
they portray rather idealized, blank and even somnambulant subjects,
and our interest in them is directed entirely toward their sexual
features and aspect. But when art works are dismissed as being merely
fantastical this is because they are construed as essentially a ﬂight away
from reality—they remain unconstrained by considerations of believ-
ability, plausibility, or truth to life. But Klimt’s explicit portraits of
intimate sexual arousal do not obviously fail to be “true to life.” As a
study in sexual self-absorption, which, as it happens, is being repre-
sented in order to be arousing, the line drawings seem to capture
certain kinds of sensual states rather well. They do so in virtue of Klimt’s
imaginative, artistic treatment of the sexually explicit, formulaic, and
fantasy elements that constitute the pornographic. Thus, even if we
granted that works should be evaluated in terms of whether they are
true to life or not, it does not follow that pornographic works cannot
constitute good art on these terms. Conversely, if we denied that Klimt’s
drawings were “true to life,” in virtue of their fantastical nature, it still
would not follow that they are not highly valuable as art. For “truth to
life” is not the only criterion of artistic evaluation and, moreover, it is
not always applicable. In evaluating artworks we apply a cluster of
general criteria which concern the quality of the imaginative experi-
ence afforded. There are many kinds of representations where consid-
erations of “truth to life” are not applicable at all. Much of the work of
Edgar Allan Poe, Jorge Luis Borges, Odilon Redon, and M. C. Escher, as
well as the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm, to name but a few,
represent fantastical worlds and events to us which have their own
internal intelligibility. They afford striking, complex, and coherent
imaginative experiences and are valued highly as art. But such works
are not meant to stand in close relation to the actual world and are not
concerned with prescribing any putative insight into how we actually
are. Thus they should not be evaluated on such a basis. Where no
signiﬁcant relation is prescribed by the work with respect to how we
should understand the world, the question of whether it is “true to life”
or not does not arise and is thus irrelevant to the quality of the
imaginative experience afforded.
The argument against pornographic art based on the problem of
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purposiveness fails. Pornographic works can make imaginative use of
non-standard and standard formulaic elements in order to be artisti-
cally expressive and thereby afford a qualitatively high imaginative
experience. Pornographic purpose does not preclude meaningful
artistic aims.
III
The third challenge to the very idea of pornographic art I shall term
the problem of appreciation. The core thought is that even though a
pornographic work may be created with and realize artistic intentions,
it cannot be appreciated as both art and pornography at one and the
same time.6 For, even granting that a pornographic work can be created
with great artistic skill and expressivity, nonetheless its aesthetic aspect
cannot be appreciated to the extent that it is received as pornography.
A pornographic interest concerns attention to explicit body parts and
behavior in the service of sexual arousal and satiation. To the extent
such an interest is taken in a representation, it precludes attention to
and the savoring of a work’s aesthetic aspect. If a work is being read as
literature, then our appreciation focuses upon, among other things, the
peculiarities, fascination with and play of language, imagery, and
structural composition. But where it is being used pornographically, the
interest in such aesthetic features cannot but be minimal, if not
downright absent—since attention focused on artistically expressive
features distracts the attention away from explicit body parts and sexual
behavior which serve to arouse.
The notions of pornographic interest and artistic appreciation need
to be spelt out a little more fully. The standard view of pornography
construes it as soliciting a certain kind of objectifying interest in those
represented. As Nussbaum has argued, the notion of objectiﬁcation is a
multiply variegated concept involving, at least, notions of instrumental-
ity, denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility, violability, ownership, and
denial of subjectivity.7 Nussbaum herself notes that not all kinds of
sexual objectiﬁcation are necessarily problematic, but identiﬁes the
kind of objectiﬁcation present in pornography to be the most vicious
kind. She argues that pornography objectiﬁes by precluding a person’s
subjectivity and autonomy in virtue of presenting women (and presum-
ably men) as objects who are substitutable, subject to the control and
desire of the reader or viewer, and whose experiences matter not at all.
Similarly Scruton identiﬁes the pornographic interest, as contrasted
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with the erotic, in terms of objectifying another person through
conceiving of them as reducible to their body, thus precluding their
ﬁrst-person perspective.8 So a pornographic interest is held to be one
which involves the objectiﬁcation of a person’s body, in the service of
arousal, by denying or precluding their ﬁrst-person perspective. Thus
characterized it would seem as if a pornographic interest in something
or someone is inimical to an interest in the expression of particular
cognitive-affective states and ﬁrst-person attitudes. There is a strong
tradition, within both analytic aesthetics and Western culture more
generally, which holds that signiﬁcant or valuable art is concerned with
the representation and appreciation, via artistically expressive means,
of our cognitive-affective attitudes to and understanding of ourselves,
others, and the world. Art, in this cognitivist conception, is held to
deploy particularly sophisticated and powerful means of prescribing
our imaginings, emotions, and attitudes in order to afford us deeper
and richer understandings of what certain situations and characters
would or could be like. Artworks are thus highly valued to the extent
that, through artistic means, they vivify, deepen, or even modify our
understanding of ourselves, others, and the world. Hence, we tend to
evaluate works in terms of their insight into the human condition, the
interesting or complex ways in which they may expand or deepen our
imaginative horizons or the ways in which the world may be viewed. But
to appreciate something pornographically is, on the characterization
proffered, necessarily to be uninterested in the ﬁrst-person perspective
of the subject represented, the subject’s particular cognitive-affective
states and attitudes. Hence, to appreciate something as pornography is
inimical to its appreciation as art.
But the problem of appreciation relies on a mischaracterization of
the nature of a pornographic interest. Once we see how this is so, it can
be shown how certain works not only can be but are only properly
appreciable as pornographic art.
Note, ﬁrst, that there are many artistic works which solicit an interest
which precludes the ﬁrst-person perspective of the represented subject
and yet are appreciable, on this basis, as art. Consider, for example, the
literature of courtly love. The hero is represented as being in thrall to
the all-consuming god of love and worships the saint-like object of his
devotions. The literature’s idealization of physical passion shares with
Ovid’s Ars Amatoria an emphasis on the exquisite delights and pains of
being a slave to passion—the sighing, trembling, pale demeanor,
sleeplessness, the suspense between happiness and despair, and the
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contemplation of the idealized object of desire. Common to Ovid, the
twelfth-century troubadour poetry of Bernard de Ventadour, Chrétien
de Troyes’s Lancelot, Froissert’s L’Horloge Amoureux and his chivalrous
romance Méliador, Francesco Petrarch’s Sonnets to Laura and the
thirteenth-century allegorical poem Roman de la Rose are representa-
tions of the female as an object of passion to be possessed, and her
autonomy and subjectivity, except in relation to the aspiring male’s
desire, is precluded. A similar preclusion of the represented subject’s
ﬁrst-person perspective is manifest in much visual art from Correggio,
Rubens, the Pre-Raphaelites, Rodin, Eric Gill, the nudes of Courbet
and Renoir through to the more recent work of Robert Mapplethorpe.
It might be objected that, in at least some of these cases, the preclusion
of the ﬁrst-person perspective is not concomitant with a focused
attention on body parts in the service of arousal. But consider Correggio’s
Jupiter and Antiope, Gervex’s Rolla, Courbet’s Le Sommeil, or much of the
work of Eric Gill. All depict explicit nudes where the subject’s con-
sciousness is entirely precluded, in virtue of sleeping, and the viewer’s
attention is directed toward the subject’s body parts in order to solicit
an objectifying interest which gives rise to sensuous thoughts and
arousal. Our attention is drawn to the tones and contours of ﬂesh, and
the sexual parts are framed by the structural composition of the works.
The eyes are closed and the subjects clearly asleep so our attention is
solicited with respect only to the physical nature of their bodies. Yet we
would not be tempted to say that we cannot appreciate such works as art
as we attend to them in the way prescribed.
Second, the characterization of a pornographic interest in terms of
the preclusion of a subject’s ﬁrst-person perspective seems to mark out
a kind of depersonalized interest. The assumption seems to be that we
are uninterested in the subject, as a person, in whom we take a
pornographic interest. Yet such interest, at least in many cases, seems to
be essentially interested and personal. In order for sensuous thoughts
and arousal to arise, far from being uninterested, we must usually be
interested in the subject in some way. Consider the way much narrative
pornography seems to work. The reader or viewer is not straightaway
presented with nude bodies and sexual acts. Rather, characters are
presented in some semblance of a situation and, albeit usually very
crudely, a narrative develops, leading into sexual arousal and satiation.
Now the stock roles and crude dialogue and paraphernalia enable the
audience to make believe that their imaginings concern particular
people with certain states, dispositions, and character traits. This is
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essential in order to be interested in the (usually ﬁctional) character as
a person. If the characters represented were straight away represented
in graphic sexual activity from start to ﬁnish, then it would be harder to
take up a pornographic interest in them. In such a case, it would be
easier to see them just as bodies or as we might view animals copulating,
which constitutes a depersonalized interest but certainly not one likely
to be found arousing. Indeed, many paradigmatic pornographic repre-
sentations concentrate on the ﬁrst-person perspective of those in whom
one is prescribed to take up a pornographic interest. For, in order to
elicit sexual arousal from the reader or viewer, our attention is directed
toward what the characters putatively believe, desire, and feel. Now, the
ﬁrst-person interest and overarching narrative in most pornography is
of little interest as such. But the point is, it need not be.
Consider Nicholson Baker’s Vox in this regard. At one level the novel
follows a pornographic formula—the novel introduces characters on a
telephone sex line; they are somewhat coy, abashed, and the conversa-
tion banal. We are then led into their exchange of sexual fantasies and
exploits, which are themselves of a fairly standard pornographic sort, in
a familiar pattern of scenario set-up: sexual suspense followed by
explicitly detailed consummation. It is not merely a novel about sexual
arousal but seeks itself to be arousing in virtue of the way the
conversation and fantasies are represented. Nonetheless there is much
more to the novel than this. As one of the two characters tails off in
relating a scene, the other person takes it up, modifying and develop-
ing it in a way the other person had perhaps not intended. The
structure thus not only conveys a sense of the reciprocal nature of
elaborating sexual fantasies, the nature and word play of seduction and
sexual arousal, but brings out a kind of sexually competitive edge
between the two characters. How will they manage to keep each other
on the line when one could hang up at any moment? In so doing, Baker
also plays with the peculiarities and oddities of language that the
characters have, and the way they attempt to use it in relation to an
apparently overly familiar and banal subject—the pornographic. In the
novel’s concern with the peculiarities and fascination of language, in its
expressivity regarding the sexually mundane and explicit, the arousal
both portrayed and solicited from the reader is symbiotically enhanced
by the literary features of the work. It is a novel which aims to be and is
only properly appreciable as pornographic art.
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